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An Analysis and Criticism of the
Model Penal Code Provisions on the
Law of Abortion
Thomas H. Barnard, Jr.
In this critical analysis, the author first calls attention to the many
reasons necessitating an examination of the Model Penal Code's abortion
provisions. It is his view that the American Law Institute followed the
sociological jurisprudential approach in drafting the Code's abortion sec-
tion, and he points to the Advisory Committee's comments in support of
this proposition. Mr. Barnard also believes that the Swedish and Danish
abortion statutes exerted significant influence upon the ALl but that the
effects of these laws were not given sufficient consideration, with the re-
sult that no attempt was made to eliminate the problems caused by their
enactment. Finally, the author raises several probing questions which
must be considered by those who would change the law of abortion and
concludes that the Code represents a commendable though imperfect at-
tempt to answer them.
HERE ARE several reasons for devoting special attention to
the Model Penal Code provisions concerning abortion,1 per-
haps the most important of which are that the proposals emanate
from the august body of men who comprise the American Law Insti-
tute (ALI) and that the Code
generally has been widely ac-
THE AUTHOR (B.A., University of Pu- claimed. Other reasons are
get Sound, LL.B., Columbia University) that the Model Penal Code ap-
is a practicing attorney in Cleveland,
Ohio, and a member of the Ohio State proach appears to be represen-
Bar Association. tative of the approach of others
who would have the law of
abortion reformed, that the
Code is usually referred to whenever the question of reform is raised,
and that it has in fact been the solution embraced by political ac-
tivist groups and medical associations seeking legislative reform.
Another very practical reason for devoting attention to this sec-
tion is that the Model Penal Code, like preceding ALl model codes,
will receive serious consideration, and it may be enacted into law
by state legislatures. Naturally, one does not expect this somewhat
revolutionary proposal concerning matters of sex and morality to be
accepted without a struggle. Thus far, in fact, it has been ill-
I MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) [hereinafter cited as
TENT. DRAFT].
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received by our lawmakers.2 While this reception might rightfully
be attributed to sexual mores and the legislators' usual reluctance to
tread in controversial areas, it is submitted that the Code supporters
carry a heavy burden of proof in the area of abortion law reform,
for which they have failed to make adequate preparation.
This section of the Code has been more enthusiastically received
by scholars and writers.3 While most indicate their approval of
the Code's liberalized approach,4 there are some in their number
who have been highly critical.5 Among the criticisms is the charge
that the American Law Institute failed to give adequate considera-
tion to the moral aspects of the abortion issue.' One critic states:
The practice of consulting with experts in fields other than law
which was employed in successive drafts of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code has been neglected in the instance of the Model Penal
Code. The Criminal Law Advisory Committee includes sociolo-
gists, psychiatrists and other medical experts but the area of moral-
ity and ethics seems not to be represented at all.7
Another criticism is directed toward the characterization by the
Code comment of the fetus as an inchoate being.' The authors of
an article defending the legal status quoP devote considerable atten-
tion to this characterization, saying in part that the embryo or fetus
may be "inchoate" but it is indisputably complete and integrated in
terms of its essential elements; it requires nothing but food to grow.
In terms of ultimate full development to maturity, the infant after
birth is comparably an inchoate creature." Parenthetically, it is in-
teresting to note the comparison of the fetus to an infant. This
comparison assumes added significance when eugenic indications
2 George, Current Abortion Laws: Proposals and Movements for Reform, 17 W.
REs. L Rav. 371, 395-96 (1965).
3 See generally Goodman, Abortion and Sterilization: The Search for Answers,
Redbook, Oct. 1965, p. 148; Rosen, Psychiatric Implications of Abortion: A Case
Study in social Hypocrisy, 17 W. RES. L. REV. 435 (1965); Comment, 27 U. PITT. L.
REv. 669 (1966); Note, 12 W. RiEs. L. REv. 74 (1960).
4 E.g., Rosen, supra note 3, at 462 n.90.
5 See, e.g., Tinnelly, Abortion and Penal Law, 5 CATHOLIC LAW. 187 (1959).
6 Ibid.
7Id. at 190. Professor Schwartz reporting at the Al proceedings, stated that this
was not a moral problem because of the enormous difference of views in a community of
our size. See 36 ALl PROcEEDINGS 252 (1959).
8 Mietus & Mietus, Criminal Abortion: "A Failure of Law" or a Challenge to So-
ciety? 51 A.B.A.J. 924 (1965). 'The embryo or fetus may be 'inchoate' but it is indis-
putably complete and integrated in terms of its essential elements; it requires nothing
but food to grow. In, terms of ultimate full development to maturity, the infant after
birth is comparably an inchoate creature." Id. at 925.
9 Id. at 924.
10 Id. at 925.
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are considered, especially because deformities are problematical at
the fetal stage but can be conclusively established after birth. There
are other considerations, of course, such as the anxiety of the expect-
ant mother and her family before birth and the probability of a
greater attachment to the child, even if deformed, after birth.
Additional critical observations to this section of the Code are
found in a recent law review note'1 which directed attention toward
the legal rights of the unborn child 2 in light of the increased rights
being given to the unborn in the law of torts. It was also suggested
"that abortion laws are required by the community as a symbol of
formal disapproval of behavior that in specific instances is being
condoned."' 8 This suggestion raises a basic jurisprudential question:
What is the function of the law? This query is particularly relevant
when considering abortion laws.
I. MODEL PENAL CODE APPROACH
Before analyzing the Code and the discussion and pronounce-
ments of the American Law Institute, perhaps attention should be
directed to the function of that body. Whether intended or not,
the ALl fits neatly into the realization of the fondest dreams of the
sociological jurisprudent. It approaches the idea of the "ministry of
justice" suggested by Bentham and Roscoe Pound, 4 and it is the
embodiment of the law revision committee recommended by Mr.
Justice Cardozo, 5 who observed that in private law there is no lobby
for change and, therefore, a group of professors, judges, and other
outstanding jurisprudents should meet periodically to review it.'"
Whatever the purpose of the American Law Institute, the prac-
tice, at least with regard to the law of abortion, has been to use the
sociological jurisprudential approach; this philosophy is readily ap-
parent in the Code comments'7 and in the Advisory Committee
11 Comment, 37 U. COLO. L. REv. 283 (1965).
12 Id. at 283-85.
13 Id. at 288.
14 Pound, Juristic Problems of National Progress, 22 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 721, 729,
731 (1917); Pound, Anachronisms in Law, 3 J. AM. JUD. SOC'y 142, 146 (1920).
15 Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REv. 113 (1921).
16 Id. at 114. See also Goodrich, The Story of the American Law Institute, 1951
WAsH. U.L.Q. 283, 294-99 and Tinnelly, supra note 5, which criticize the American Law
Institute for entering the realm of criminal law but laud its efforts in other fields.
Since Cardozo referred to private law only, he might support the Catholic proposition.
However, it is submitted that the reluctance of legislators and other public officials to
move into areas involving sex and morality is a good reason for use of the "law revision
committee," at least in that limited area of criminal law.
17 TENT. DRAFT, comments 1-15.
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Report to the 1959 ALI proceedings. The first step in the socio-
logical school of thought is to study the actual effects of doctrines,'"
and, consistent with this, the initial inquiry set forth in the com-
ments is devoted to exposing the "salient features of American ex-
perience."' 9  The "salient features" listed, six in all, are: (1) the
high number of abortions in the United States; (2) the number of
women who die annually in the United States as a result of abor-
tion; (3) the contrast of the American abortion mortality rate to that
of the U.S.S.R.'s during the latter country's liberal abortion law ex-
periment; (4) a comparison of the illegal abortions performed as
a result of premarital pregnancies to those of married pregnant
women; (5) a breakdown as to who performs the abortion; and (6)
the practice of hospitals in California in "violating" the law."°
Thereafter, the comments state the arguments for a relaxation
of the law. It is observed that "economic and social conditions are
said to be the primary cause of abortion. Economic distress, or a
desire to maintain a higher standard of living, is at the root of the
largest number of induced abortions."" Then, continuing in the or-
der followed in the comments, a "cautious expansion of the cate-
gories of lawful justification of abortion" 2 is recommended follow-
ing four principles 3 which, it will be observed, closely adhere to
the sociological jurisprudential approach.24 First, it is stated that
indiscriminate abortion is a secular evil involving some physical
and psychic hazards.25 The natural consequences of this observa-
tion coincide with Pound's theory on adjusting conflicts of interest.
Here the Advisory Committee is weighing the speculative and social
consequences likely to be suffered by the pregnant woman.
The second consideration involves the "extremely adverse social
consequences [likely to be suffered byl ... the child."2  Here, too,
there is a weighing of speculative consequences, but in this instance
the alternatives are death for the unborn child versus a potentially
18 Eugen Ehrlich, a legal sociologist, called this a study of the "Living Law," which
is to see not how men ought to act, but in fact how they do act. See O'Day, Ehrlich's
Living Law Revisited - Vindication for a Prophet Vithout Honor, 18 W. RES. L.
Rim. 210 (1966).
19  T. DRAFT, comment 1. See also 36 ALT PROCEEDINGS 256-57 (1959).
20 Ibid.
21 Tnir. DRAFT, comment 2, at 149.
22 TENT. DRAFT, comment 1, at 150.
23 TENT. DRAFT, comment 1, at 150-51.
24 Ibid.
2 5 TENT. DRAFT, comment 1, at 150.
20 Ibid.
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miserable life. Ostensibly, this statement again manifests a regard
for the interest of the individual.
The third consideration is that criminal law must not be used
"against a substantial body of decent opinion."27  This is an attack
on the moral approach which the law is deemed presently to follow.
The sociological jurisprudent would explain that today the law is
creating friction in civilized society, which is undesirable under
Pound's formula for adjusting interests.28 The fourth principle is
that "criminal liabilities which experience shows to be unenforceable
because of nullification by prosecutors or juries should be eliminated
from the law."29 This is clearly the approach of an advocate of the
"living law."80
The comments continue with a discussion of the arguments
against liberalization. Again, the sociological approach is followed
by methodically raising and answering certain sociological argu-
ments of the opposition.3 The comments first state: "abortion is
opposed by some on the ground of physical or psychic danger to
the woman, or as an inhibitor of population growth."82  They then
go on to say that
legalizing abortion would be regarded by some as encouraging
or condoning illicit intercourse, although this factor can hardly be
a significant influence on the rate of illicit sexuality in a society
where contraceptives offer reasonable assurance against need for
the unpleasant and expensive prospect of abortion 33
27 TENT. DRAFT, comment 1, at 151.
28 See generally Pound, Anachronisms in Law, 3 J. AM. JJD. SOC'y 142 (1920).
29 TENT. DRAFT, comment 1, at 151.
30 See O'Day, supra note 18.
31 TENT. DRAFT, comment 1. This section also considers the arguments of those
opposed to liberalization which are not sociological, but moral, ethical, or religious.
The Committee subsequently answers them by stating:
Moral standards in this area are in a state of flux, with wide disagreement
among honest and responsible people. The range of opinion among reason-
able men runs from deep religious conviction that any destruction of incipient
human life, even to save the life of the mother, is murder, to the equally 'fer-
vent belief that the failure to limit procreation is itself unconscionable and
immoral if offsprings are destined to be idiots, or bastards, or undernour-
ished, mal-educated rebels against society .... [See VOGT, PEOPLE (1960)].
Criminal punishment must be reserved for behavior that falls below standards
generally agreed to by substantially the entire community. TENT. DRAFT,
comment 1, at 151.
Professor Schwartz stated, in reporting at the ALl proceedings, that this is not a moral
problem at all but that "it is a problem of the sanctity of life." 36 ALI PROcEEDINGs
252 (1959).
32 TENT. DRAFT, comment 1, at 148. These arguments are answered at pages
150-51.
3 3 TENT. DRAFT, comment 1, at 148-49. It will be recalled that most abortions in
the United States are performed on married women.
[Vol. 18: 540
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There is one point in particular, however, where the authors of
the comments stray from the sociological approach and begin to
make their own value judgments without the process of critical
thinking.34 The comments state:
There seems to be an obvious difference between terminating
the development of such an inchoate being, whose chance of ma-
turing is still somewhat problematical, and, on the other hand, de-
stroying a fully formed viable fetus of eight months, where the
offense might well become ordinary murder if the child should
happen to survive for a moment after it has been expelled from
the body of its mother.85
This will be the subject of later criticism.
Having enumerated the arguments for and against change, the
comments next set forth an analysis of the individual Code provi-
sions."6 For present purposes, it is not particularly helpful to re-
state this analysis except in two specific instances. The first con-
cerns the decision to exclude "individual hardship" cases as a justi-
fication for abortion."7 While calling attention to the laws in
Sweden and Denmark, which permit abortion for a variety of indi-
vidual hardship cases as determined by a board of physicians, the
comments state: "the draft refrains from taking any position for or
against [these] justifications ... .""8 The reason given is that no
body of experience with such a law is found in the American so-
ciety. However, the comments indicate the Advisory Committee's
concern in this area and infer that these individual hardship cases,
if not handled legally in hospitals or by trained medical personnel,
will be driven instead to criminal abortionists and many to needless
death.39
The second part of the comments' analysis given attention here
is the decision not to impose criminal liability upon the pregnant
woman who obtains an abortion except in late-pregnancy situations,
that is, after viability.4" The reason given in the comments, is that
imposing criminal liability upon the woman "has not been useful in
suppressing self-abortion, but instead has offered stumbling blocks
34 TENT. DRAFT, comment 1, at 149.
35 Ibid. (Emphasis added.) This position is vigorously attacked in Mietis & Mie-
tus, supra note 8, at 924-25.
3 6 TENT. DRAFT, comments 2-15.
37 TENT. DRAFT, comment 6, at 156.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 TENT. DRAFT, comment 9, at 159.
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to effective enforcement against the professional abortionists, or has
served as an unfair escape from civil liabilities of insurance com-
panies. '
II. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
As observed previously,42 it is apparent that the ALI has used
the sociological jurisprudential approach in developing the section
on abortion in the Model Penal Code. The Institute has attempted,
by critical thinking, to examine the law in light of the evidence
and the conclusions which it supports. The drafters have also at-
tempted to recognize the problems and to find workable solutions
to them, to gather and interpret pertinent information, to appraise
evidence and evaluate arguments, to reconstruct their patterns of
beliefs on the basis of wider experience, and, generally, to apply this
critical thinking to the construction of a logical abortion law.48 An
examination now follows as to their success with this method of
analysis."
41 Ibid. The comment's conclusion as to the insurance companies' "unfair escape'
arises from decisions holding that the company is relieved from liability under the
woman's life insurance policy by her complicity in procuring an abortion on herself.
See Hatch v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 120 Mass. 550 (1876); Wells v. New England Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 191 Pa. 207, 43 At. 126 (1899). Query, is this "unfair"? If so, how
significant is this reason?
42 See text accompanying note 17 supra.
48 Critical thinking calls for a persistent effort to examine any belief or sup-
posed form of knowledge in the light of the evidence that supports it and the
further conclusions to which it tends. It also generally requires ability to
recognize problems, to find workable means for meeting those problems, to
gather and marshal pertinent information, to recognize unstated assumptions
and values, to comprehend and use language with accuracy, clarity, and dis-
crimination, to interpret data, to appraise evidence and evaluate arguments, to
recognize the existence (or nonexistence) of logical relationships between
propositions, to draw warranted conclusions and generalizations, to put to test
the conclusions and generalizations at which one arrives, to reconstruct one's
patterns of beliefs on the basis of wider experience, and to render accurate
judgments about specific things and qualities in everyday life. GLASER, AN
EXPmRIENT IN THE DEVELOPM3NT OF CRITICAL TmNKi'KG 6 (1941).
See also Lewis, Phase Theory and the Judicial Process, 1 CAL. W.L. REV. 1
(1965).
44 The realist, or skeptic if you will, would doubt whether there is a logical answer
to the problem of abortion. For example, Holmes stated:
It is because of some belief as to the practice of the community or of a
class, or because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short, because of some
attitude of yours upon a matter not capable of exact quantitative measure-
ment, and therefore not capable of founding exact logical conclusions. Such
matters really are battle grounds where the means do not exist for determina-
tions that shall be good for all time, and where the decision can do no more
than embody the preference of a given body in a given time and place.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 466 (1896).
[VoL 18: 540
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A. The Experiences of Denmark and Sweden
The Model Penal Code provisions on abortion are in many
ways similar to the statutes of Denmark and Sweden,45 yet there are
some important distinctions. It is clear that the Code's draftsmen
had the statutes of these Scandinavian countries in mind as they ap-
proached their task The initial criticism in this analysis of the
Code is that the experiences of these two countries were not given
sufficient consideration. First, however, a comparative examination
of the Code and the foreign statutes is necessary.
The proposed official draft of the Model Penal Code and both
the Danish and Swedish statutes permit abortion by a licensed
physician under the following conditions: (1) when the pregnant
woman's physical or mental health is gravely impaired; (2) when
the child is likely to be born with grave'physical or mental defects;
or (3) when the pregnancy is the result of rape, intercourse with an
underage female, or incest." The first important difference be-
tween the Code and the statutes in these countries is that the former
does not provide for abortion where there is "anticipated weakness"
or what the comments apparently refer to as individual hardship.
Another significant difference is the decision not to have an inde-
pendent board or committee determine whether an abortion should
be performed. Instead, the Code provides that an abortion may be
performed where "two physicians, one of whom may be the person
performing the abortion,... have certified in writing the circum-
stances which they believe to justify the abortion."4  While the
distinction between certification by individual physicians and by a
board might properly be deemed procedural in some respects, it
must also be considered to have certain substantive aspects, because
decisions by individual physicians offer a greater latitude for varia-
tion and, hence, further broaden the law.
Considering the similarity between the Code and the statutes of
Denmark and Sweden, it is relevent to inquire whether the ALI has
profited by experience. Has it marshaled and interpreted the perti-
nent information from these countries? It is the author's opinion
that it has not.48 There was not, of course, a total disregard of the
45 See apps. B & C infra.
46 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) [hereinafter
cited as CODE], which is set forth in app. A Jafra. See also apps. B & C infra for the
Swedish and Danish provisions.
47 CODE § 230.3(3).
48 One school of realist jurisprudence known as "fact skeptics," of which Jerome
Frank is a noted example, seriously questions whether it is possible to retrieve all the
1967]
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experiences with liberalized abortion laws. The Advisory Commit-
tee took note of the lowered abortion mortality rate experienced in
the Soviet Union 9 and considered reports of adverse physical and
psychic experiences by the women on whom abortions were per-
formed.5° The comment also makes an argument which sounds
logical enough but does not reflect actual experience. 5 The com-
ments state:
Proponents of liberalization would add that criminal repression
of abortions which are widely regarded as permissible can only lead
to the illicit performance of the operation by quacks under condi-
tions much more likely to kill the mother. On this hypothesis,
abortion law purporting to be based on the morality of saving life
actually results in more deaths.52
While this statement obviously refers only to deaths of mothers,
even within those limits the experiences in Denmark and Sweden do
not support the conclusion reached.53 There is still considerable dis-
agreement as to exactly what is shown by the statistics in the two
countries, but it is dear that they do not support the assertion of
the Advisory Committee that liberalizing the law saves life. An
authority from Denmark reporting on the experience in that coun-
try after the relaxation of abortion laws"4 states - after pointing
out that the number of legal abortions has increased from five hun-
dred to five thousand annually - that "it is difficult to establish if
the number of illegal abortions during the same period have de-
creased or increased, but in any case the number is estimated as very
high, perhaps twelve thousand yearly."5
pertinent data. This is not necessarily inconsistent with sociological jurisprudence,
since the latter school only seeks to gather as much information as is available and con-
siders an important part of its process the testing of conclusions and the reconstruction
of beliefs.
4 9 TENT. DRAFT, comment 1, at 147.
50 TENT. DRAFT, comment 1. The U.S.S.R. ostensibly discontinued liberalized
abortion on this ground for a period of almost twenty years. However, it is arguable
that the continuation of a pregnancy might, in certain cases, result in greater physical or
psychic danger to a woman than would an abortion.
51 TENT. DRAFT, comment 1, at 150.
52 Ibid.
53 At this point the first two "salient features of American experience" -stated by
the Advisory Committee should be brought to mind: (1) the high number of abortions
committed, and (2) the number of women who died annually as a result of abortion.
54 CALDBRONE, ABORTION LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (1958), quoting Dr.
Carl Clemmesen, consultant in psychiatry, National Health Service, Copenhagen, Den-
mark
55 Ibid. See Leavy & Kummer, Criminal Abortion: A Failure of Law, 50 A.B.A.J.
52 (1964), stating that "as long as there are any restrictions at all, women with un-
wanted pregnancies who are determined to abort will seek out and find illegal abor-
tionists." Id. at 55.
[Vol. 18: 540
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Sweden apparently experiences a similar high illegal abortion
rate and, while some persons claim that there has been a lower rate
of criminal abortion because of the increased frequency of legal
abortion, there are others of the opinion that the number of criminal
abortions has remained the same." One authority has suggested
that the total number of criminal abortions in these countries has
increased because the legislature has helped to remove the feeling
that abortion is wrong and that an "abortion mentality" has ex-
tended to all women who have unintentionally become pregnant."
Two observations may be made about the high number of il-
legal abortions still being performed in Sweden and Denmark,5"
with, presumably, the same high proportion of deaths. First, the
statistics are possibly wrong or will reverse themselves in the future.
While this is doubtful, even if true the significance of the mothers'
mortality rate is so great that it should be conclusively established in
a thorough and disinterested study. Second, accepting as true the
58 CALIERoNB, op. cit. supra note 54, at 30, referring to Dr. Af Geijerstam, De-
partment of Women's Diseases, Karoliska, Sjukhuset, Stockholm, Sweden. See ST.
JOHN-STEVAS, THE RIGHT TO LWE 34 (1963): "Such evidence as there is, however,
suggests that legalized abortion does not reduce the illegal rate."
57 In WILLIAMS, THE SANCITY OF LIFE AN THE CRRINAL LAw (1957), the
author states:
Another factual ground of criticism of the legislation both in Sweden and
in Denmark is that it has not substantially reduced the number of illegal abor-
tions; according to one opinion, these have actually become more numerous
because the legislation has helped to remove the feeling that abortion is wrong,
and indeed promotes an abortion mentality which extends to all women who
have become unintentionally pregnant. Whether it is true to say that illegal
abortions have increased or somewhat diminished is controversial, but investi-
gation has shown that a proportion (ranging from 15 to 33 per cent) of the
women refused legal abortion have afterwards had their pregnancy ended by
abortion, whether natural or illegal. Id. at 241-42.
58 Perhaps the mortality rate for illegal abortions might even increase under these
circumstances because doctors, having gained liberalization of the law, would more
closely adhere to it and, therefore, a greater proportion of induced abortions would be
of the "back-alley" variety. This follows from one argument made in favor of liberali-
zation, namely, that we should liberalize the law so that doctors may follow it. In this
connection, one must also consider the reaction of the woman who has been refused a
legal abortion. Having first obtained the courage to seek an abortion legally, how is
she likely to accept rejection? This is a question to be left for the psychiatrists. Fur-
thermore, since the request for a legal abortion, the examination, and determination all
require time, the woman is placed in even greater danger when she goes to the "back-
alley surgeon," because it is recognized that abortion in the later months of pregnancy
poses a greater danger to the woman.
Consider also how the liberalization of abortion laws will affect the unscrupulous
practitioner. Will he be discouraged? At best, it might be argued that with liberali-
zation the prosecutors could vigorously enforce the law. But do they not already attempt
to prosecute the non-medical man? And what about the jury? What effect will a more
liberal statute have on its attitudes?
59 While further development of sex education, intensified propaganda for plan-
ning parenthood, and more numerous consulting centers have been recommended,
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proposition that there has been little or no effect on the number of
illegal abortions performed, a sociological problem is created for the
mother which is no less significant than it was before revision and
which is worse with respect to the fetus, since legality has raised the
total number of abortions.6" This would mean that the safe, equiv-
ocal position taken by the American Law Institute - which offers
no remedies to the problem created in Sweden and Denmark and
which does not extend as far as the Russian or Japanese positions6
which have in fact reduced the number of illegal abortions by
enabling virtually any pregnant woman to secure one62 - fails to
improve upon three of the six "salient features of American experi-
ence" enumerated in the Code's comments.63
The above indicates the shortcomings of that part of the Swedish
and Danish approach which the Code accepts. Now follows an
examination of what can be expected in proposing legislation which
falls short of the law in those two countries, primarily the exclusion
of "anticipated weakness" as a ground for abortion and the failure
to use the board or committee system of determination. Because of
the ALI's rejection of these two provisions, the law would be
changed very little from what it is today in the more "liberal" juris-
dictions and, further, the remaining ills which might be cured by
enacting the substance of the Scandinavian laws are left unremedied.
One of these ills, referring again to the "salient features" set forth in
the Code comments, is that a substantial number of medical practi-
tioners and a large number of hospitals fail to abide by the present
law.
64
It has been said that proposals which extend therapeutic excep-
tions and yet remain consistent with the underlying rationale of our
law only slightly ameliorate the situation we have today65 and that
the basic turning point in liberalizing the law appears to be the ex-
ception for "anticipated weakness," otherwise described as "eco-
CALDERONE, op. cit. supra note 54, at 31, it appears that Sweden has already advanced
in these areas, and it is questionable whether such measures will afford a solution to the
problems in that country. Id. at 31-32.
60 To say that an abortion is "worse" for the fetus concededly presumes some value
in the life of the unwanted child.
6 1 TAussIG, ABoRTION, SPONTANEOUS AND INDUCED 410 (1936) (commenting
on the experience of the U.S.S.R.).
62 Ibid.
63 See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra. The author has in mind the high
mortality rate, the comparison to the lower mortality rate in the U.S.S.R., and the ques-
tion of who performs the abortion.
64 See Leavy & Kummer, supra note 55, at 52.
65 Note, 32 IND. LJ. 193, 205 (1957).
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nomic distress." 6  Even the Advisory Committee recognized the
problem of economic distress67 and appeared disturbed by its own
recommendation.6" The Committee stated:
The final area of controversy is whether social or economic fac-
tors should be considered in abortion legislation. Such situations
are created when the pregnant woman is, for example, carrying an
illegitimate child and has several other children, or she has been
abandoned by her husband and is burdened with sickness or delin-
quency problems among her other children. One authority has
estimated that ninety per-cent of illegal abortions are suffered by
women in such situations and who are willing to risk their lives
and health in back street surgery.69
It is important to note that the Model Penal Code recommenda-
tion states that the physical or mental health of the mother must be
"gravely" impaired," a term which cannot be expected to receive a
construction broad enough to include, for example, social and eco-
nomic considerations. Referring to the earlier section of this article
setting forth the present practice of much of the medical profession
and many hospitals,71 the provision can be said only to enact what
is already practiced.7" Furthermore, in considering this catchall in-
dication, however it is labeled, there is the problem of psychiatric
justifications. The Advisory Committee recognized this problem
and stated that psychiatric justifications are difficult to dassify and
verify and that "psychiatrists themselves have expressed concern at
the shadowy line between mental and social justification." 8 Does
the Code offer any guidelines?
The statistics in Sweden bear out the significance of this added
justification. After the initial law revision, there was little change
66 Id. at 201 n.49, where it is stated: "If economic distress is the principal cause of
abortion, then an exception for economic necessity would render abortion laws largely
nugatory even in the absence of deliberate evasion." See note 64 supra and accompany-
ing text.
67 TueT. DRAFT, comment 1, at 149: "Economic and social conditions are said to
be the primary cause of abortion. Economic distress, or a desire to maintain a higher
living standard, is at the root of the largest number of induced abortions."
68 TENT. DRAFT, comment 6.
69 Kenney, Thalidomide-Catalyst to Abortioo Reform, 5 Aiuz. L. REV. 105, 108-
09 (1963). See also Note, 12 W. REs. L. REV. 74 (1960), which states that "social
and/or economic considerations are never considered as grounds for justifiable abor-
tion. However, these socioeconomic factors deserve consideration due to the fact that
the majority (estimated at 90%) of all criminal abortions are performed on married
women who seek to avoid the economic burden of another child." Id. at 83-84.
70 TENT. DRAFT, comment 3, at 152.
71 See text accompanying note 20 supra.
72 See Leavy & Kummer, supra note 55, at 52 for a study of the California hospitals.
7 3 TENT. DRAFT, comment 3, at 153.
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in the rate of abortions until 1946 when the requirement of "weak-
ness" was broadened to include "foreseen weakness";74 thereafter,
the number of abortions performed in that country sharply in-
creased, with approximately sixty percent performed on the com-
bined grounds of weakness and anticipated weakness. Compared
to this percentage, the indications for medical reasons amounted
only to 30.2 percent; the percentage for eugenic indications, that is,
the expectation that the child would inherit some mental disease,
deficiency, or other serious illness or defect, amounted to 9.2 per-
cent; and the percentage for humanitarian indications, such as a
pregnancy caused by rape, incest, or the impregnation of a girl under
age, amounted to only .3 percent.7 5 These statistics might also indi-
cate that the real effect of the Code, at best, is a clarification of the
medical indications justifying abortion and an extension of the law
only where there are eugenic and humanitarian indications, which
amount to but a small percentage of the abortions performed.
The other major distinction between the Code and the Scandi-
navian approach is the procedure for determining a valid justifica-
tion. The Code permits a physician to perform an abortion with
the written concurrence of another physician if they both state that
there are justifying circumstances. Denmark and Sweden use per-
manent committees or boards to varying degrees. The Code pro-
cedure, it is submitted, does not give the guidelines needed by
physicians and only serves to assist the more unscrupulous practi-
tioner.
The reason given against the use of such boards was that there
was no "body of experience" in the United States to handle these
matters. 6  This appears to be a weak argument. First, is there
really no such body? Many hospitals in the United States already
utilize the board approach, for this purpose as well as for other
crucial decisions such as medical experimentation."' Second, al-
though hospital boards might be distinguished because they are
private in nature, is the mere fact that presently there are no public
boards truly significant? Other administrative tribunals have also
had to make unprecedented determinations at one time, and perhaps
74 WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 57, at 240.
7 5 CALDERONE, op. cit. supra note 54, at 28.
76 TET. DRAFT, comment 6, at 156.
77 See paper delivered by Lewis, Restrictions on the Use of Drugs, Animals and
Persons in Research, Rockefeller Institute Conference on Law and the Social Role of
Science, April 8, 1965.
[VoL. 18: 540
MODEL PENAL CODE ON ABORTION
there is even an advantage to a fresh start at this point in medical
history.
There seem to be excellent reasons for using a board approach.
Perhaps the best reason given is that the board takes the decision
out of the hands of the individual,78 thereby supporting the conser-
vative physician who believes that an abortion is desirable but is
hesitant to perform it because he fears possible censure. This ap-
proach also protects the obstetrician or surgeon who is inclined to
specialize in this field but who is concerned at being labeled an
"abortionist, 7 and it also protects society from the unscrupulous
physician who is concerned only with a fee or with the desire to
build a practice in defiance of the law." In addition, the board is
likely to have a broader perspective and an objectivity not attained
by the physician personally involved in the individual case.81 An-
other advantage of the use of boards is that a body of law would be
developed from their decisions which would further define the
guidelines in a manner similar to our federal administrative rul-
ings.
2
The composition of the boards is important and should be given
careful consideration. It would seem that medical experts such as
obstetricians, gynecologists, or psychiatrists would be preferable per-
sons to serve on the boards because of their expertise. Others who
might be considered are sociologists, (if sociological factors are to be
given weight), members of the legal profession (to interpret statutes
and previous decisions), or laymen (to serve in the capacity of a
jury). 3
78 CALDERONE, op. cit. supra note 54, at 123; Trout, Therapautic Abortion Laws
Need Therapy, 37 TIMP. L.Q. 172, 183 (1964).
79 The experience in the Soviet Union dearly establishes the value of specializing in
this practice. See TAUSSIG, op. cit. supia note 61, at 417.
80 WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 57, at 236: "For the protection of the surgeon
who operates, it would obviously be desirable to have the case passed upon by some
official board, as is done in Denmark and Sweden."
81 Cf. Lewis, supra note 77, wherein he discusses the use of the board as a regulator
of human experimentation and states that "this will lend both a broader perspective and
an objectivity not attained by the investigator who is personally involved in the experi-
ment."
82 CALDERON, op. cit. supra note 54, at 123 rites Dr. Lidz as stating: "A board
would still have to make decisions, but this would put it in a position occupied by the
courts, in which interpretations of the law are made from year to year as the practical
applications of it arise, and over a period of time a general basis for the interpretation
of the law is established." See also Trout, supra note 78, at 184: "It endows a continu-
ing body with a basis for developing cumulative expert judgment."
83 When dealing with cases of mental incapacity, the board composition in Sweden
consists of one physician, usually an obstetrician, one layman, preferably a woman, and
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B. Concerning the Sanctity of Life
Perhaps the most important shortcoming of the American Law
Institute approach is the failure to consider and evaluate fully the
arguments regarding the "sanctity of life."84  At the 1959 ALI
proceedings, where this section of the Code was discussed, Professor
Schwartz appropriately began by characterizing abortion as a prob-
lem of the sanctity of life,85 but thereafter this basic issue was not
thoroughly explored. Instead, the ALI followed the Advisory Com-
mittee's evaluation which was not really a result of critical thinking,
but was what Bertrand Russell would call "'special pleading," or the
finding of arguments for a conclusion given in advance.
The Advisory Committee's consideration of the sanctity of life
was almost entirely limited to the life of the woman, with very little,
if any, consideration given to that of the fetus. While the Commit-
tee recognized the argument that destruction of the fetus approaches
murder, it minimized the human characteristics of the fetus prior to
the fourth month of pregnancy when it is most likely to be aborted
and then stated:
the Chief of the Bureau for Social Psychiatry of the Medical Board. When an abortion
is sought on eugenic grounds, a specialist in genetics joins the board. For any other
indications, two physicians may decide the matter, one being a properly appointed medi-
cal officer and the other the surgeon who will perform the operation. CALDERONE,
op. cit. supra note 54, at 27.
Dr. Geijerstam, the reporter for Sweden, does not discuss the rationale underlying
the criteria for membership on the special committee. It seems obvious, however, that
a social psychiatrist should be on the committee where there is a claim of mental in-
capacity, and that the genetics specialist should be on the committee when eugenic
grounds are alleged. But the selection of the other two members of the committee
raises some questions. Why the layman? Is she to serve as a juror, finding facts and
representing a cross-section of Swedish women? Would Americans entrust court deci-
sions on the facts to one layman? Perhaps a non-jury trial before a judge is analogous,
but his special training and experience might also make the example distinguishable.
Possibly she (or he) is to serve as the "humanizing" factor in what might be otherwise
a cold, scientific decision. But should emotional or "humanizing" ,factors be involved?
Is not the sole question whether the woman is mentally fit to carry the baby until de-
livery or whether it is likely that the baby will be born deformed? And what of the
third panel member, the physician who is "usually an obstetrician"? If the question is
strictly a scientific one regarding mental fitness, why not another psychiatrist or a com-
mittee of three psychiatrists? If it is a fact-finding role, another layman would serve
the purpose. If an obstetrician is desirable, is he not equally desirable when the other
indications are claimed (but when the decision is now left to a medical officer and a
surgeon)? See also, Jakobovits, Jewish Views on Abortion, 17 W. RES. L. REV. 480,
481-82 (1965), contending that the judgment called for is not medical at all but moral
and should be taken from the physicians and given to "moral experts."
84 "[F]acts albeit scientifically ascertained are of themselves of no avail; for they
do not evaluate themselves. And if the evaluation is not given either by substantial
unanimity or by an authoritative form of words, the task has only begun when the facts
have been gathered, organized and interpreted." STONB, THE PRoVINcB AND FUNcTION
OF LAW 387 (1950).
85 36 ALI PRocEEDiNGs 252 (1959).
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There seems to be an obvious difference between terminating
the development of such an inchoate being, whose chance of ma-
turing is still somewhat problematical, and, on the other hand, de-
stroying a fully formed viable fetus of eight months, where the
offense might well become ordinary murder if the child should
happen to survive for a moment after it has been expelled from
the body of its mother.86
The true significance of this basic point - what value has the life
of the fetus and how does it compare with the life of the pregnant
woman? - is apparent when one observes that it is at this point
that the line is most clearly drawn between those favoring a liberal
abortion policy and those espousing a more conservative policy.
While no attempt is made here to provide the resolution of this
value conflict between the fetus and the pregnant woman, it is in-
cumbent upon us to note this basic issue and understand the varying
approaches.
Doctors also disagree on this point; one writer refers to the fetus
as no more than a uterine tumors" while another compares abortion to
the use of the "gas chambers of Buchenwald.""8 Religious opinions
range from the rabbi who contends that the "fetus is a part of the
mother prior to birth and as such can be sacrificed for the sake of
the mother, just as an arm or leg could be amputated," ' to the
Catholic view that any abortion is the killing of an innocent human
being." One analyst of American statutes asserts that they have
been designed to protect the pregnant woman, 1 while another states
that the underlying rationale of contemporary abortion statutes is
that abortion is a crime against the fetus. 2 As to what the law
should be, some say that the purpose should be the protection of
the fetus life, 3 and others say that lawmakers should not be con-
cerned with the fetus but with injury to the pregnant woman. 4
8 6 TENT. DRAFT, comment 1, at 149. See also Mietus & Mietus, Criminal Abortion:
"A Failure of Law" or A Challenge to Society?, 51 A.B.A.J. 924, 925 (1965), wherein
the authors attack this position.
87 WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 57, at 230.
88 Comment, 37 U. COLO. L. REv. 283, 291 (1965).
8 9 Mietus & Mienms, supra note 86, at 924-25. In this article, and particularly this
discussion, the authors call attention to the use of the word "mother" as opposed to
"pregnant woman," and so forth. The authors believe that "mother" is perhaps inac-
curate and should only be used after birth, but they are also concerned with the advan-
tageous psychological effect of the word "mother" vis-4-vis "fetus."
9 0 Tinnelly, Abortion and the Law, 5 CATHoLIc LAW. 187, 190 (1959).
91 Leavy & Kummer, supra note 55, at 53.
9 2 Comment, supra note 88, at 292.
9 3 Ibid. See note 97 infra regarding semantics.
94 WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 57, at 154.
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Still others are concerned with both the fetus and the pregnant
woman.
95
On the issue of the quality of life, one position emphasizes the
innocence of the human life of the fetus,96 another position main-
tains that the quality of the woman's life is the more significant,97
and, again, there is a middle road position, that there is no quality
difference but that "the mother is able to speak for herself, whereas
the child is obliged to be silent."98  A proponent of liberalization
has pointed out that the death of the fetus passes without public
notice (for example, no obituary),9 but Catholics apparently will
make a great effort to baptize the unborn.' Moreover, when the
proponent of liberalization contends that if the fetus has the right to
life, so has the pregnant woman,' 0 ' it is certain that the conservatist
would reply that if the pregnant woman has a right to life, so has
the fetus.
While the above only serves to illustrate the differences of opin-
ion and to show the significance of the value issue, it does not assist
in any way to formulate a means to resolve the conflicting interests.
And while the conflicting interests concern the fetus vis-4-vis the
pregnant woman, other interests to be considered are the family to
which the pregnant woman belongs, or into which the fetus will
some day be born, and the community.
First - for convenience only and with no intention to make a
value judgment - what should be considered with regard to the
fetus? It is life, no one questions that. But where does it fit into
the scheme of human life? Does it have an independent existence?
And, if it does, to what extent? When does life begin? While one
answer is that life commences with the union between the sperm
and the ovum, this raises a question regarding the life of sperm and
the unfertilized ovum, perhaps answerable by making a value deter-
mination based on probabilities.0 2
95 Note, supra note 65, at 194-95.
96 36 ALI PROCEEDINGS 261-62 (1959) (remarks of Mr. Quay); 5 CATHOLIC LAW.
190 (1959); Mietus & Mietus, supra note 86, at 927.
97 WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 57, at 163-64, wherein it is especially noted that
the mother suffers pain and that there is a greater loss both morally and socially than
when the fetus is destroyed.
98 ST. JOHN-STVAS, op. cit. supra note 56, at 35.
99 See WILI.IAMS, op. cit. supra note 57, at 227.
100 Id. at 195-96.
101 WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 57, at 196.
102 Cf. Mietus & Mietus, supra note 86, at 925. While eighty-five percent of all
pregnancies develop to the stage of viability, "the mathematical odds of fertilization of
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Should any distinction be made between different stages of de-
velopment of the fetus, infant, or young child? On what would
such a distinction be based? On pain? On consciousness? Theo-
logians have suggested the "soul" as a basis, but does the fetus have
a "soul," and, if so, when is it acquired? Is it a question that can
be answered? Of what importance is the quality of life the child
will eventually lead if born deformed' ° or without one or both
parents, or into poverty or other unfavorable conditions? Should
man make this judgment? If so, how should it be made? On the
basis of probabilities? Where does one draw the line?
When questioning the independent existence of the fetus, the
corollary questions are whether the fetus is to be considered a part
of the pregnant woman and, if so, to what extent. Is it to the ex-
tent that the woman may treat the fetus as part of her own body,
and may a woman abuse her own body? How is the woman's life
to be compared to that of the fetus? Is "innocence" relevant, and,
as previously suggested, what is innocence? Is one life more impor-
tant and, if so, by what standard? Should the standard be life ex-
pectancy or the present love of others for the woman? How impor-
tant is the woman's present role as a wage-earner, a mother of other
children, or a mother of future children? Considering the quality
of the woman's life, will it make her happier or more miserable, and
will childbirth or an abortion shorten her life?
While weighing these considerations, alternatives should not
be overlooked, especially the possibility that the unwanted child
might be placed with an adoption agency after birth, thereby in-
creasing the happiness of some couple not able to have their own
children. Consider also the mentally disturbed woman; if a real
threat of suicide exists, not only will the woman's life be taken but
also that of the fetus - except possibly very late in pregnancy.
Then, too, compare the value of the mentally disturbed mother's
life with that of her presumably normal child.
Perhaps there should be different considerations for the mar-
ried woman as compared with the single woman. The single
woman usually faces social disgrace' and serious economic prob-
the ovum by the one particular spermatozoon out of an ejaculate of 200,000,000 to
600,000,000 spermatozoa available in a normal insemination, are obviously astronomi-
cal."
103 Ns. Sherri Finkbine, an Arizona housewife who received considerable pub-
licity in 1962 when she sought an abortion after taking thalidomide while pregnant,
stated that her greatest and most surprising support came from deformed persons or
their families who almost unanimously urged her to go ahead with her abortion.
104 CALDRON, op. cit. supra note 54, at 55: 'Thebirth of a child prior to mar-
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lems if she is self-supporting. The married woman, however, usu-
ally has similar economic or social problems, and this fact raises
several questions which concern the family unit. A large, poor
family faced with an extra mouth to feed and a mother not able to
work at full capacity will surely suffer. Should not the other young
children be considered? But there are other alternatives and con-
siderations such as adoption and an increased welfare check.
This leads to a consideration of the effect on the community,
and whether the public should be required to carry the financial
burden. It has also been demonstrated that the unwanted child is
very likely to be a juvenile delinquent.0 5 Perhaps the greatest con-
cern of the community is population control. But it seems that
there are better means of achieving this goal - assuming it to be
desirable. What alternatives exist? Pope Paul VI, in his address
before to the United Nations in 1965, stated: "Your task is to en-
sure that there is enough bread on the tables of mankind and not
to encourage artificial birth control, which would be irrational, in
order to diminish the number of guests at the banquet of life."10
But are birth control and food production mutually exclusive, or do
they complement each other?
The mother, the community, and the family are also adversely
affected by the burden of a mentally or physically defective child in
their midst. But what standard should be applied in determining
what is "defective"?.. 7  Should it be merely mental and extreme
physical defects? What difference is there between the destruction
of a defective fetus and a defective, helpless human? Perhaps the
community also has an interest in improving the quality of human
life in a manner similar to that which has been used to improve
strains of corn or cattle. What if one society practices eugenic con-
trol while another does not? Will such practices reduce man's re-
spect for human dignity?
The foregoing are just some of the questions which must be an-
swered in evaluating the sanctity of life concept and its impact upon
the lives of the fetus and its mother as well as upon the family and
riage is not the social disgrace among the socially lower-level Negroes that it is among
college girls, and this is something that touches upon a reality we must always take
into account.
105 WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 57, at 218-19.
106 N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1965, p. 6, col. 6.
107 Mierus & Mietus, supra note 86, at 926: "Has the world gained or lost from the
services of the epileptic Michelangelo, of the deaf Edison, of the hunchbacked Stein-
metz, of the Roosevelts--both the asthmatic Theodore and the polio-paralyzed Frank-
lin?"
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the community. Perhaps this section should be related to the previ-
ous discussion regarding review boards.' The seemingly infinite
number of questions underlines the need for a continuing body to
answer them as they arise. In addition, perhaps the close relation
between abortion and contraception should be observed so as to
minimize, if possible, this conflict in the first instance.
C. The Pregnant Woman: Victim or Protagonist?
According to the Model Penal Code, it is only after the twenty-
sixth week of pregnancy that self-abortion is to be considered a
criminal act on the part of the woman," 9 and even in this case the
Advisory Committee states as its first reason the fact that there is
greater danger to the woman at the end of pregnancy, and only as
a second reason, does it consider the fetus."' However, in reaching
its decision on how to deal with the pregnant woman, it is dear that
the committee considered another factor to be significant in deter-
mining the criminal responsibility of the aborting woman, namely,
that it was not efficacious to denounce the pregnant woman as a
criminal.
Using the sociological technique as previously illustrated, the
Advisory Committee noted that "the prosecution of the mother is
so rare that no reported decisions have been found,""' that her co-
operation is needed in convicting "abortionists,""' 2 that it is unlikely
that there is any deterrent effect,"' and that a greater evil would be
perpetrated by sending the woman to prison." 4  In setting forth
these facts, the committee followed the argument of other propo-
nents of liberalization."15
One criticism of this liberal attitude toward the aborting mother
is that there has been virtually no consideration of the "ought.""'
10 8 See notes 77-84 supra and accompanying text.
109 CODE §§ 280.3(3). See app. A. infra.
110 Tim. DRAFT, comment 9, at 158.
11 Ibid.
112 TENT. DRAFT, comment 9, at 159.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid. Sociological jurisprudence is not the only jurisprudential school con-
cerned with efficacy. Most schools of jurisprudential thought take this into serious con-
sideration. The realist evaluates the law as to its effects, as does the analytic jurispru-
dent. The positivist qualifies the rule by stating that a law should be "substantially"
efficacious, and the natural law adherent is more concerned with what ought to be
done than what is done, although he, too, takes cognizance of legal efficacy.
"1r WILLIAMs, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMNAL LAw 153-54 (1957).
116 Some have suggested that abortion laws be left on the books "as a symbol of
formal disapproval of behavior," even though in specific instances the acts are con-
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Some consider this attitude as indicative of a weakness of the socio-
logical technique, but here it demonstrates the incomplete use of
this approach. As indicated previously," 7 in applying Pound's origi-
nal theory of maximizing man's total number of interests in life in
civilized society for the least amount of friction and waste," 8 the
draftsmen include only the pregnant woman when they consider
"man" and consider "life" only as life after it is separated from the
mother."'
Also evident in this section is the failure to obtain all relevant
information. In reaching their decision to condone the woman's
acts, the draftsmen have apparently ignored behaviorism, particu-
larly that of the pregnant woman. 2 Consider the opinion of one
authority quoted earlier who asserted'2 ' that the liberalization of
abortion laws has created an "abortion mentality" in the Scandi-
navian countries, leading to an increased number of legal and illegal
abortions. An important corollary to this proposition might be
that a more strict abortion law, perhaps aimed directly toward the
woman, would actually lessen the number of abortions. This is at
least a genuine possibility meriting detailed study.
It is obvious that the pregnant woman is the one who seeks
out the abortionist and not vice versa and that the decision to pro-
ceed with the operation is usually made by her.' If this is true,
what motivates her decision, and how does that relate to the law?
One bio-psychological study indicates that the normal pregnant
woman wishes to stay pregnant until the child is born 28 and that
any woman who aborts even with excellent social reasons has been
at least partially motivated by unconscious and neurotic wishes.'24
doned. Comment, supra note 88, at 288. See Note, 32 IND. L.J. 193, 200 (1956).
While this is perhaps primarily an "ought" consideration, it may well be the position of
the positivist regarding efficacy, that is, substantial efficacy.
117 See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
118 See Pound, Anachronisms in Law, 3 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 142 (1920).
119 Cf. GLASER, AN EXPERIMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRITICAL THINKING
6 (1941), wherein the author states that one of the objectives of critical thinking is "to
comprehend and use language with accuracy, clarity, and discrimination."
12 0Ibid. (regarding the importance of obatining all relevant information.)
121 See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
122 DEVERAUX, A STUDY OF ABORTION IN PRIMITIVE SocirTlEs 90 (1955):
Our data shows that the decision to abort, or not to abort, is made either by
the pregnant woman herself, or by a person capable of imposing his will upon
her, or by society as a whole. This decision results from a choice between two
kinds of stress, one of which is-rightly or wrongly--deemed to be less pain-
ful than the other.
123 Id. at 94.
124 Id. at 97. This would find -favor with those adhering to natural law concepts.
The condusion stated, however, is disputed.
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While basic organismal processes influence the decision against
abortion, it is the worlds of the ego, the super ego, and external
reality which favor abortion.'25 Will the law influence the latter
three? Admittedly, certain socio-economic considerations are im-
portant parts of the external reality which contribute to the deci-
sion, but so, too, are the legal considerations. And how does the law
function today? A few states already provide no penalty for the
woman 26 and several others in various ways provide lower penal-
ties than were imposed at common law.'27 While not exactly creat-
ing an "abortion mentality," as is said to be found in Scandinavia,
perhaps this has already had a significant effect upon the woman
who may be considering whether or not to abort the fetus by con-
vincing her of what she wants to believe: that it is not her wrong-
doing' but that of the abortionist.
Perhaps this is what the members of the Advisory Committee
have also done. They collected an incomplete set of sociological
data, followed a "hunch," and reached a decision which the realists
would say they wanted all along.
III. CONCLUSION
While the tone of this article is obviously critical, the author
nevertheless believes that the American Law Institute has taken a
giant step in an area of the law which has long been neglected in
this country. It has served a valuable function in bringing the seri-
ous imperfections of present laws to light. However, in an explo-
sive area touching on sex and morals where legislators fear to tread,
the author also believes that proponents of modernization must
come better prepared with convincing evidence that their solution
will improve the status quo.
125 Ibid.
126 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-3-1 (1956); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 101
(1959).
127 See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-212 (1956); CAL. PEN. CODE § 275;
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-30 (1960); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-602 (1948); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 10-106 (1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.19 (1964); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 94-402 (1949); N.Y. PEN. LAw § 81; N.D. CENT, CODE § 12-25-04
(1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 862 (1958); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-84 (1962);
S.D. CODE § 13-3102 (1939); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-2 (1953); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 940-04 (1958); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-78 (1957).
12 8 The use of the word "wrongdoing" in connection with the woman is admittedly
presumptuous, but so is this section.
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(1) Unjustified Abortion. A person who purposely and un-
justifiably terminates the pregnancy of another otherwise than by a
live birth commits a felony of the third degree or, where the preg-
nancy has continued beyond the twenty-sixth week, a felony of the
second degree.
(2) Justifiable Abortion. A licensed physician is justified in
terminating a pregnancy if he believes there is substantial risk that
continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or
mental health of the mother or that the child would be born with
grave physical or mental defect, or that the pregnancy resulted from
rape, incest, or other felonious intercourse. All illicit intercourse
with a girl below the age of 16 shall be deemed felonious for pur-
poses of this subsection. Justifiable abortions shall be performed
only in a licensed hospital except in case of emergency when hospital
facilities are unavailable. [Additional exceptions from the require-
ment of hospitalization may be incorporated here to take account
of situations in sparsely settled areas where hospitals are not gen-
erally accessible.]
(3) Physicians' Certificates; Presumption from Non-Compli-
ance. No abortion shall be performed unless two physicians, one of
whom may be the person performing the abortion, shall have certi-
fied in writing the circumstances which they believe to justify the
abortion. Such certificate shall be submitted before the abortion to
the hospital where it is to be performed and, in the case of abortion
following felonious intercourse, to the prosecuting attorney or the
police. Failure to comply with any of the requirements of this Sub-
section gives rise to a presumption that the abortion was unjustified.
(4) Self-Abortion. A woman whose pregnancy has continued
beyond the twenty-sixth week commits a felony of the third degree
if she purposely terminates her own pregnancy otherwise than by a
live birth, or if she uses instruments, drugs or violence upon herself
for that purpose. Except as justified under Subsection (2), a person
who induces or knowingly aids a woman to use instruments, drugs
or violence upon herself for the purpose of terminating her preg-
nancy otherwise than by a live birth commits a felony of the third
degree whether or not the pregnancy has continued beyond the
twenty-sixth week.
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(5) Pretended Abortion. A person commits a felony of the
third degree if, representing that it is his purpose to perform an abor-
tion, he does an act adapted to cause abortion in a pregnant woman
although the woman is in fact not pregnant, or the actor does not
believe she is. A person charged with unjustified abortion under
Subsection (1) or an attempt to commit that offense may be con-
victed thereof upon proof of conduct prohibited by this Subsection.
(6) Distribution of Abortifacients. A person who sells, of-
fers to 'sell, possesses with the intent to sell, advertises, or displays
for sale anything specially designed to terminate a pregnancy, or
held out by the actor as useful for that purpose, commits a misde-
meanor, unless:
(a) the sale, offer or display is to a physician or druggist or to
an intermediary in a chain of distribution to physicians or
druggists; or
(b) the sale is made upon prescription or order of a physician;
or
(c) the possession is with the intent to sell as authorized in para-
graphs (a) and (b); or
(d) the advertising is addressed to persons named in paragraph
(a) and confined to trade or professional channels not like-
ly to reach the general public.
(7) Section Inapplicable to Prevention of Pregnancy. Noth-
ing in this Section shall be deemed applicable to the prescription,
administration or distribution of drugs or other substances for avoid-
ing pregnancy, whether by preventing implantation of a fertilized
ovum or by any other method that operates before, at or immediately
after fertilization.
APPENDIX B
DANISH PROVISIONS ON JUSTIFIED ABORTION*
The pregnancy of a woman may be terminated under the follow-
ing circumstances:
(1) If termination of pregnancy is necessary to avoid serious
danger to the life or health of the woman. In appraising this dan-
ger account shall be taken not only of physical or mental disease,
but also of present or imminent states of physical or mental weak-
ness. All circumstances shall be considered, including the condi-
tions under which the woman has to live.
* From § 1, Statute of June 23, 1956 (transl. Professor Knud Waaben, University
of Copenhagen), as reproduced in MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, app. at 165 (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1959).
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(2) If the pregnancy of the woman resulted from violation of
[specified Sections of the criminal code referring to rape by force or
with a mental incompetent, incest, intercourse with young girls, and
intercourse with dependent or institutionalized females under cir-
cumstances involving serious infringement of the woman's freedom
of action].
(3) If there is manifest danger that, because of hereditary pre-
disposition or defect or disease originating at the fetal stage, the child
will suffer from insanity, mental deficiency, or other serious mental
disturbance, epilepsy, or serious and incurable abnormality or physi-
cal disease.
(4) If, under exceptional circumstances, serious physical or
mental defects or other medical considerations indicate that the
woman may be considered unfit to take care of her child.
APPENDIX C
SWEDISH PROVISIONS ON JUSTIFIED ABORTION"
The termination of pregnancy shall, under this Act, be justified:
(1) If, as a consequence of disease, physical defect or weak-
ness, the birth of the child would involve serious danger to the life
or health of the mother.
(2) If, taking into account the living conditions of the woman
and other factors, there is reason to believe that her physical or
mental strength would be seriously impaired by the birth and care
of the child.
(3) If the pregnancy of the woman resulted from violation of
[specified Sections of the criminal code referring to rape by force or
with a mental incompetent, incest, intercourse with young girls, and
intercourse with dependent or institutionalized females under cir-
cumstances involving serious infringement of the woman's freedom
of action].
(4) If there is reason to believe that the woman or the father
of the expected child will, as a result of hereditary predisposition
transmit to their offspring insanity, mental deficiency, serious dis-
ease or other serious defect.
** From Statute of June 17, 1938, as amended, May 17, 1946 (transL Professor
Knud Waaben, University of Copenhagen), as reproduced in MODEL PENAL CODE S
207.11, app. at 166 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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